On the consistency of random serial dictatorship

Xiang Han

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 145, issue C, 168-171

Abstract: The random serial dictatorship (RSD) can be generalized to indivisible object allocation problems allowing fractional endowments such that symmetry, ex-post efficiency and strategy-proofness are preserved. However, there exists a consistent extension of RSD if and only if the population is less than four. The inconsistency of the generalized RSD is a common feature of strategy-proof rules that satisfy minimal fairness and efficiency properties: symmetry, ex-post efficiency, consistency and strategy-proofness are not compatible.

Keywords: Consistency; Random serial dictatorship; Random assignment; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:168-171

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.06.005

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