On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts

Jun Zhang

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 145, issue C, 230-234

Abstract: We introduce two new sufficient conditions for the existence of stable outcomes in many-to-one matching with contracts. The conditions subsume the observable substitutability of Hatfield et al. (2015) and the substitutable completability of Hatfield and Kominers (2016) as special cases. We also prove that unilaterally substitutability and irrelevance of rejected contracts imply substitutable completability.

Keywords: Many-to-one matching; Stability; Substitutability; Irrelevance of rejected contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516302336
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:230-234

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.06.029

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().