Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision

Pierre Boyer, Yukio Koriyama and Elisabeth Schulte ()

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 146, issue C, 120-122

Abstract: We study a two-stage mechanism in a setting with asymmetric information about preferences for a public good. We view deliberation before the implementation of a mechanism as an opportunity to provide legitimacy of using the mechanism. We show that the d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) mechanism is incompatible with informative deliberation.

Keywords: Deliberation; Public good; Ex post efficiency; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:120-122

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041

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