Breaking the rules: Anticipation of norm violation in a binary-choice trust game

Wolfgang Breuer, Christiane Helduser and Philipp Schade

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 146, issue C, 123-125

Abstract: Studying a binary-choice trust game, we find that trustors who consider trustees to be obligated to reciprocate are ceteris paribus less willing to trust. We argue that norm-orientated trustors anticipate that they will experience negative emotions should trustees violate the obligation to reciprocate. In order to avoid norm violation, trustors lower their willingness to trust. An additional binary-choice trust game, in which subjects act as trustors and subsequently as trustees, reveals that the obligation that trustors assign to the trustee role may be based on social projection.

Keywords: Trust; Norm; Reciprocity; Reference point; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:123-125

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.038

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