Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents

Yoshihiro Ohashi

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 146, issue C, 21-23

Abstract: The efficient outcome of a deposit contract model is uniquely implementable with relatively partially honest agents, while it is never uniquely implementable only with materially self-interest agents.

Keywords: Preference for honesty; Implementation; Mechanism design; Behavioral economics; Bank run (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516302543
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:21-23

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.014

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().