On the IENBR-solvability of two-person finite games

Takuya Iimura

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 146, issue C, 68-70

Abstract: We show that a two-person finite game is solved by the iterated elimination of never best responses (IENBR) if and only if it is best response acyclic and strongly solvable in the sense of Nash (1951). Thus the rationalizable strategies (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984) are equivalent to the Nash equilibrium strategies in two-person finite games if and only if the two conditions are met. We prove this for both mixed strategy games and pure strategy games.

Keywords: Iterated elimination of never best responses; Rationalizable strategies; Best response acyclic games; Strongly solvable games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:68-70

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.023

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