Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand

Benjamin Tello ()

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 146, issue C, 85-88

Abstract: In the context of many-to-one matching with contracts, we show that for any choice function that satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition (Aygün and Sönmez, 2013) and selects at most two contracts from any given set of contracts (two-unit demand), bilateral substitutability and weak substitutability are equivalent. As a corollary, we obtain a new maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings in the unit-capacity couples model. Finally, we show with an example that the equivalence between bilateral and weak substitutability crucially depends on the two-unit demand condition.

Keywords: Matching; Contracts; Stability; Couples; Weak substitutability; Bilateral substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:85-88

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.016

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