The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: A Bayesian persuasion perspective

Xin Feng and Jingfeng Lu

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 147, issue C, 103-107

Abstract: Following a Bayesian persuasion approach, we establish that full disclosure (resp. concealment) is the contest organizer’s effort-maximizing policy for disclosing the number of actual contestants if the characteristic function of the imperfectly discriminatory contest technology is strictly concave (resp. convex).

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Contests; Information disclosure; Stochastic entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:103-107

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.038

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