Prize and incentives in double-elimination tournaments

Lingbo Huang

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 147, issue C, 116-120

Abstract: I examine a game-theoretical model of two variants of double-elimination tournaments, and derive the equilibrium behavior of symmetric players and the optimal prize allocation assuming a designer aims to maximize total effort. I compare these theoretical properties to the well-known single-elimination tournament.

Keywords: Double elimination tournaments; Single elimination tournaments; Optimal prize allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D4 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:116-120

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.035

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