Asymmetric information and search frictions: A neutrality result

Neel Rao

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 147, issue C, 138-141

Abstract: This paper integrates asymmetric information between firms into a canonical model of on-the-job search. Workers are heterogeneous in ability, but not all employers observe a worker’s type. Wage dispersion caused by search frictions makes the equilibrium wage distribution insensitive to informational asymmetries. Hence, the equilibrium outcome may be the same as when a worker’s ability is known to every firm. The supportability of the full information outcome depends on market parameters related to productivity, knowledge, and search. The theoretical results elucidate an empirical puzzle about demographic differences in asymmetric information between employers.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Human capital; Equilibrium search; Wage dispersion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 J31 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:138-141

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.040

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