Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: A problem of Japan’s nursery school choice

Yasuo Sasaki and Masahiro Ura

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 147, issue C, 38-41

Abstract: We conduct a simulation analysis to see the trade-off between employing serial dictatorship and reducing unmatched children in nursery school choices. It is motivated by a social problem in Japan: there are a large number of children who wish to get into nursery schools but stay unmatched, while serial dictatorship is widely used.

Keywords: Matching; Nursery school choice; Serial dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:38-41

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.020

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