Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection

Alberto Palermo

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 148, issue C, 91-95

Abstract: This paper studies bargaining with hold-up in presence of adverse selection and endogenous type distribution. With limited liability for the agent, quantities of first best are not socially optimal. The allocation of bargaining power is never completely in favor of one party.

Keywords: Bargaining; Adverse selection; Hold-up (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D02 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:148:y:2016:i:c:p:91-95

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.09.025

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