Social objectives in general equilibrium

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 148, issue C, 99-102

Abstract: I consider an exchange economy in which each agent’s preferences are given by Ui=ui+θF, where ui is a standard utility function, F is a social objective function and θ is the weight F receives. Both F and θ are common to all individuals. I show that F’s equilibrium value may be a decreasing function of θ. I also show that if F is a social welfare function whose arguments are the ui’s, then the economy’s equilibria are independent of θ.

Keywords: General equilibrium; Consumption externalities; Other-regarding preferences; Social objectives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:148:y:2016:i:c:p:99-102

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.09.033

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