How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information

Luca Ferrari

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 149, issue C, 157-160

Abstract: I study sincere voting equilibria in elections with public information in a large Poisson game. In addition to rational voters, the electorate is characterized by the presence of partisan voters who vote according to their ideological position. I show that the set of public signals compatible with sincere voting becomes smaller as the number of partisan voters vanishes which suggests that, when the number of partisan voters is small, public information hardly manipulates voting decisions.

Keywords: Strategic voting; Large Poisson games; Public information; Partisan voters (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:157-160

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.041

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