Sen cycles and externalities

Ashley Piggins () and Gillian Salerno

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 149, issue C, 25-27

Abstract: Sen’s (1970) theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal depends on the presence of externalities. Saari and Petron (2006) show that for any Sen cycle, every decisive individual suffers at least one strong negative externality. We show that this result only holds when individual preferences are strict. We prove a general theorem for the case of weak preferences.

Keywords: Sen’s impossibility theorem; Liberal paradox; Saari–Petron theorem; Externalities; Social preference cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516303998
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Sen cycles and externalities (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:25-27

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.007

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().