Head starts in dynamic tournaments?

Philipp Denter and Dana Sisak

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 149, issue C, 94-97

Abstract: In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with completely symmetric agents. Awarding a small head start increases maximum individual effort without decreasing aggregate effort.

Keywords: Personnel economics; Contests; Tournaments; Head start (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:94-97

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.008

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