What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?

Irenaeus Wolff

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 150, issue C, 83-85

Abstract: Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one-shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-to-omnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.

Keywords: Public good; Social dilemma; Nash-equilibrium; Conditional cooperation; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:83-85

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015

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