Exclusive contracts and bargaining power

Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima and Misato Sato

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 151, issue C, 1-3

Abstract: Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient new supplier entry through exclusive contracts.

Keywords: Antitrust policy; Entry deterrence; Exclusive contracts; Nash bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L12 L41 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:151:y:2017:i:c:p:1-3

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.021

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