Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
Noriaki Matsushima and
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 151, issue C, 1-3
Incorporating Nash bargaining into the standard one-buyer-one-supplier framework in the Chicago School critique, we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient new supplier entry through exclusive contracts.
Keywords: Antitrust policy; Entry deterrence; Exclusive contracts; Nash bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L41 L42 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Exclusive Contracts and Bargaining Power (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:151:y:2017:i:c:p:1-3
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