Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests
Christoph March and
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 151, issue C, 23-27
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our results can be explained by a simple model of disappointment aversion.
Keywords: Asymmetric contest; Discouragement effect; Disappointment aversion; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Asymmetric Discouragement in Asymmetric Contests (2016)
Working Paper: Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:151:y:2017:i:c:p:23-27
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