Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 152, issue C, 100-104
This paper considers a class of evolutionary game-theoretic models, namely those in which agents form beliefs about the behavior of others on the basis of random samples from the population. It shows that the dynamics of these models violate the property of monotonicity, which many authors have argued any well-specified evolutionary model should possess.
Keywords: Evolution; Replicator dynamics; Monotonicity; Sample-based beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:100-104
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