Quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory

Tobias Hiller

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 152, issue C, 36-40

Abstract: Overeducation is an empirical phenomenon in two dimensions: qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative overeducation addresses a firm’s decision, to train more employees than needed. One explanation for this decision is modeled in this article—that of classical bargaining power. The main idea is that after investing in human capital the employer uses employees outside the firm to raise the bargaining power when he negotiates with the employees within the firm on how to share the profit of the firm. To model this, we use cooperative game theory for the first time. The labor market is modeled by a coalition structure and the payoffs are determined by the χ value (Casajus, 2009).

Keywords: Quantitative overeducation; Cooperative game theory; χ value; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 J24 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:36-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.010

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