Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance

Anastasios Dosis

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 152, issue C, 5-8

Abstract: I formalize a rather stylized insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly. I formally specify demand functions and profits and prove that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well-known Rothschild–Stiglitz allocation is efficient.

Keywords: Insurance; Adverse selection; Duopoly; Contracts; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:5-8

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.030

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