New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation

Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 152, issue C, 76-78

Abstract: This paper proposes new necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation. Our result says that especially in certain environments including matching environments, restricted monotonicity alone is necessary and sufficient for secure implementation. Our application of the result to a school choice environment demonstrates that secure implementability of the deferred acceptance rule depends on the priority structure of schools over students.

Keywords: Secure implementation; Nash implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Restricted monotonicity; School choice; The deferred acceptance algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:76-78

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.009

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