A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model

Liang Mao () and Tianyu Zhang

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 152, issue C, 79-82

Abstract: For a two-player bargaining model, Mao (2016) extends the alternating offers procedure of Rubinstein (1982) to more general procedures and explores which payoff outcomes are feasible, in the sense that they can be supported by some procedures as subgame perfect equilibria. In this paper, we define a special class of procedures called normalized procedures. We show that while the set of normalized procedures can yield all feasible partitions, none of its proper subsets can do so.

Keywords: Strategic bargaining; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Normalized procedures; Minimal sufficient set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:79-82

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.006

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