Adapting to climate change: Is cooperation good for the environment?

Nahid Masoudi and Georges Zaccour

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 153, issue C, 1-5

Abstract: We consider the formation of an international environmental agreement focusing on adaptation to climate change. Members of the agreement fully share their knowledge and determine their investments in R&D by maximizing their joint welfare, while non-members optimize their individual payoffs. Using a three-stage game formalism, we obtain that a large coalition is achievable and that total emissions increase with the size of the agreement. The welfare implications are parameter dependent.

Keywords: International environmental agreement; Climate change; Adaptation; R&D; Spillover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:153:y:2017:i:c:p:1-5

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.018

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