Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs

Daniel Li ()

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 153, issue C, 47-50

Abstract: This paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with costly participation, and shows that, when bidders’ valuation distribution is concave, there is a simple condition to rank the equilibrium competition of those auctions. It also investigates how the results are related to stochastic ordering of bidders’ valuation distributions, and provides some illustrative examples.

Keywords: Auctions; Participation costs; Competition; Concave distribution; First order stochastic dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176517300484
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:153:y:2017:i:c:p:47-50

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().