Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings

Piotr Dworczak and Anthony Lee Zhang

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 153, issue C, 57-60

Abstract: In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equilibria of an economy in which types are consumers with quasilinear utility and unit demand. Due to the welfare theorems, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it induces an efficient matching between types and goods.

Keywords: Implementability; Walrasian equilibrium; Efficient matchings; Assignment problem; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:153:y:2017:i:c:p:57-60

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022

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