Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Boris Ginzburg

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 154, issue C, 120-123

Abstract: Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere voting is an equilibrium strategy for an arbitrarily large proportion of voters.

Keywords: Voting; Information; Conflicting preferences; Fractionalisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:120-123

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.033

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