Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security
Ron Lavi and
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 154, issue C, 55-58
Fu et al. (2016) introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security. We show that their proposed outcomes form Nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields new price of anarchy bounds.
Keywords: Stable matching; Simultaneous single-item auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:55-58
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