Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

Diego Moreno () and John Wooders

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 154, issue C, 6-9

Abstract: We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rP above the seller’s cost c, but lowers the secret reserve price rS below the revenue maximizing reserve price r0. Further, rPKeywords: Second-price auctions; Endogenous entry; Public and secret reserve prices; Risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Reserve Prices in Auctions with Entry when the Seller in Risk Averse (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:6-9

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.006

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