Political budget cycles and fiscally conservative voters

Sebastian Garmann

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 155, issue C, 72-75

Abstract: I test whether the political budget cycle depends on the level of fiscal conservatism among voters. To this end, I use data from a referendum to collect revealed preferences for fiscal conservatism. I find that pre-election spending is increased only if voters have a sufficiently low level of fiscal conservatism. If voters are highly fiscally conservative, incumbents even decrease spending before elections.

Keywords: Political budget cycles; Fiscal conservatism; Conditionality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:155:y:2017:i:c:p:72-75

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.023

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