A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

Yu Zhou

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 155, issue C, 76-79

Abstract: We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time.

Keywords: Rationed equilibrium; Budget constraints; Price controls; Core allocation; Multi-item auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:155:y:2017:i:c:p:76-79

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012

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