On the efficiency of the first price auction

Angel Hernando-Veciana () and Fabio Michelucci

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 156, issue C, 159-161

Abstract: We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.

Keywords: Efficiency; First price auction; English auction; Privatizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:159-161

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.003

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