Moral hazard in investment and endogenous risk taking

Rui Li

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 157, issue C, 112-115

Abstract: I study a dynamic moral hazard model with endogenous risk taking, in which exposing the firm to greater risks could align the manager’s private benefit with that of the owner and thus enhance the incentive provision.

Keywords: Dynamic contract; Endogenous risk taking; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:112-115

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.018

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