Coincidence of two solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem

Todd Stambaugh

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 157, issue C, 148-151

Abstract: In 1950, John Nash gave an elegant solution to the bargaining problem using his somewhat controversial IIA axiom. Twenty-five years later, Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky gave a different solution replacing the IIA condition with their own Monotonicity condition. While the two solutions obviously coincide under certain conditions (e.g. when the problem is symmetric), they do not in general agree. This paper presents a complete account of the precise conditions under which the two solutions coincide.

Keywords: Bargaining; Nash bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:148-151

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.002

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