Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players

Christian Ewerhart

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 157, issue C, 167-170

Abstract: It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r≤2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher r.

Keywords: Tullock contest; Nash equilibrium; Heterogeneous valuations; Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Working Paper: Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:167-170

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012

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