Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players
Christian Ewerhart ()
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 157, issue C, 167-170
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r≤2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher r.
Keywords: Tullock contest; Nash equilibrium; Heterogeneous valuations; Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:167-170
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