Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts
Francesco Palazzo and
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 158, issue C, 37-40
We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.
Keywords: Asymmetric learning; Information disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:158:y:2017:i:c:p:37-40
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