A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels

Ricardo Gonçalves and Indrajit Ray ()

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 159, issue C, 177-179

Abstract: It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese–English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result.

Keywords: Japanese–English auctions; Wallet game; Discrete bids (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:177-179

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032

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