The sure-thing principle and P2

Yang Liu

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 159, issue C, 221-223

Abstract: This paper offers a fine analysis of different versions of the well known sure-thing principle. We show that Savage’s formal formulation of the principle, i.e., his second postulate (P2), is strictly stronger than what is intended originally.

Keywords: Bayesian decision theory; The sure-thing principle; Dominance principle; Conditional preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:221-223

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.027

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