Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power

Xin Feng and Jingfeng Lu

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 159, issue C, 61-64

Abstract: This paper provides a different approach to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in Tullock contests between two players with asymmetric valuations, when the discriminatory power r is between 1 and 2. Our result complements that of Ewerhart (2017) in filling up the remaining gap in the literature on the uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests.

Keywords: Asymmetric players; Discriminatory power; Tullock contests; Two-player contests; Uniqueness of equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:61-64

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.017

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