Electoral competition with strategic voters

Claudia Meroni

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 160, issue C, 64-66

Abstract: A recent literature has found a positive relationship between the disproportionality of the electoral system and the convergence of parties’ positions. Such a relationship depends crucially on the assumption that voting is sincere. We show that, when voters are players in the game and not simply automata that vote for their favorite party, two policy-motivated parties always take extreme positions in equilibrium.

Keywords: Voting theory; Strategic voting; Electoral competition; Power sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:160:y:2017:i:c:p:64-66

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.002

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