The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy

Joseph E. Harrington

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 160, issue C, 78-81

Abstract: As a penalty for illegal collusion, this paper shows that a structural remedy makes collusion unprofitable when collusion is most stable, and that it can be a greater deterrent than fines or damages.

Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; Competition law; Structural remedy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:160:y:2017:i:c:p:78-81

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.001

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