A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers

Cheng Li

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 161, issue C, 93-95

Abstract: We analyze a persuasion game in which a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender first produces information about the benefits of taking the action and then offers monetary transfers to the receiver. We characterize a sender-optimal information structure and show that limiting monetary payments may incentivize the sender to produce more information.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Monetary transfers; Signal informativeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:161:y:2017:i:c:p:93-95

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.036

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