A comparative analysis of multi-unit sequential auction under optimal reserve

Indranil Chakraborty

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 162, issue C, 34-36

Abstract: We consider sequential auction of two identical objects under the second-price rule when reserves are set optimally. We find that bidders bid more in the sequential auction when they are risk averse (CARA) than when they are not. The expected revenue is higher under the Vickrey rule than under the uniform-price rule. Hence the sequential auction generates higher expected revenue than both the Vickrey auction and uniform-price auction when bidders have constant absolute risk aversion.

Keywords: Sequential auction; Uniform-price auctions; Demand reduction; Multi-unit auctions; Risk averse bidders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:162:y:2018:i:c:p:34-36

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.10.019

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