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On the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementation

Srinivas Arigapudi

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 162, issue C, 37-40

Abstract: In a symmetric single object allocation mechanism with n agents, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equivalent deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism for a given Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Incentive compatible; Deterministic mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:162:y:2018:i:c:p:37-40