Incentives in lottery contests with draws

Shanglyu Deng, Xiruo Wang and Zenan Wu

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 163, issue C, 1-5

Abstract: We investigate the incentive consequences of introducing the possibility of draws into lottery contests. Equilibrium total effort unambiguously decreases when draws are introduced, whereas the equilibrium expected winner’s effort increases when the contestants’ valuations of the prize become sufficiently dispersed.

Keywords: Contest; Draw (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:1-5

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.028

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