Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly recognition

Mustafa Yildirim

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 163, issue C, 102-105

Abstract: Merging Eraslan and Merlo (2002) and Yildirim (2007), I examine legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly recognition. I show the uniqueness of the symmetric stationary payoff under monotone hazard rate and an inefficiently early agreement under unanimity.

Keywords: Stochastic bargaining; Costly recognition; Uniqueness; Delays (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:102-105

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.013

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