Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants

Nava Kahana and Doron Klunover

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 163, issue C, 126-129

Abstract: We apply aggregative games techniques in a novel fashion in the analysis of sequential lottery contests with n players to show that, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.

Keywords: Aggregative games; Sequential contests; Subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:126-129

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010

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