Gender differences in cheating: Loss vs. gain framing

Lara Ezquerra, Gueorgui I. Kolev and Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 163, issue C, 46-49

Abstract: We use the die-paradigm to study gender differences in cheating behavior. We find that i) both males and females do not cheat in the absence of financial incentives, ii) both males and females cheat (but not maximally) if reports are associated with financial gains or losses, and iii) males and females do not cheat differentially.

Keywords: Cheating; Incentives; Gender differences; Loss aversion; Framing; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:46-49

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.016

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