On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 163, issue C, 83-86
I consider contracting with information disclosure in the sense of Bayesian persuasion. A result by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) implies that if the principal contracts with a single, uninformed agent, the signal realization set can be restricted to the type set. I show that, otherwise, having additional signal realizations can be advantageous.
Keywords: Optimal contracts; Information disclosure; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:83-86
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